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In Ford v. Strickland,issued January 7, 1983, a divided United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the death
sentence of Alvin Bernard Ford, condemned for killing a Fort Lauderdale
police officer.
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Introduction
In Ford v. Strickland,1 issued January 7, 1983, a divided United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the death
sentence of Alvin Bernard Ford, condemned for killing a Fort Lauder-
dale police officer.2 Its ruling swept aside a major legal barrier to the
execution of Ford and 122 other death row inmates, who claimed that
the Florida Supreme Court violated their constitutional rights by read-
ing secret psychological reports during its review of their sentences.$
The 123 inmates first challenged this practice in a 1980 state court
lawsuit, Brown v. Wainwright.4 In deciding that case, the Florida Su-
preme Court denied any wrongdoing and refused to vacate their death
sentences. The United States Supreme Court, which still may ulti-
mately decide the issue, declined to hear Brown in November, 1981.'
1. 696 F.2d 804 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
2. While the habeas corpus petition filed by Ford and the Eleventh Circuit's
opinion concern seven issues in all, this comment will be restricted in scope to the issue
designated as "I" by the court of appeals.
3. That the justices did in fact engage in the practice complained of seems over-
whelmingly clear. According to an article in AMERICAN LAWYER magazine, the prac-
tice was unearthed by public defenders in 1978, who found during oral argument that
they were being challenged on information that the justices had received ex parte.
Cramer, Florida Supreme Court Declares Itself Not Guilty, AM. LAw., Apr. 1981, at
24. "But nothing was made public until August, 1980 when .. . the St. Petersburg
Times reported that the justices had seen profiles of at least 20 men who were waiting
on death row for the court to review their sentences." Id. at 25. Closely following this
report was the confirmation by a justices' law clerk "that in 1978 she shredded 30
reports on the advice of another clerk." Id. Ford's brief to the Eleventh Circuit charges
that a purge took place, and this allegation was not controverted. Brief for Petitioner-
Appellant at 57,59, Ford v. Strickland, 676 F.2d 434 (11th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Petitioner-Appellant].
4. 392 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1981, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1000 (1981).
5. 454 U.S. 1000 (1981). The order denying certiorari in Brown was issued on
Nov. 2, 1981. Just two days later, a death warrant was signed for Ford. Since Ford was
1
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Ford was scheduled to die on December 8, 1981, when the Elev-
enth Circuit granted a stay of execution less than fourteen hours before
the sentence was to be carried out. Through his appeal, the so-called
Brown issue reached a federal appellate court for the first time. Had
the federal court ruled in his favor, the death sentences of nearly two-
thirds of Florida's 201 condemned inmates might have been invali-
dated. Ford's request that he be allowed to prove his allegations
through evidentiary proceedings further posed the specter of summon-
ing sitting Florida Supreme Court justices, by federal subpoena, for
examination regarding their motives and use of the controversial mate-
rial. A victory for Ford would have dealt a staggering blow to the cred-
ibility of Florida's highest court and its overburdened appellate system.
Last April, a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit upheld
Ford's sentence,6 finding "not an iota of evidence" that the Florida
justices considered any secret material in his case. The full court then
agreed to rehear his case, indicating that its resolution of Ford would
dispose of all similar pending appeals by the other affected inmates.
The six to five decision8 in the State's favor reflects recent, conservative
trends in federal-state relations and evidences the Eleventh Circuit's
reluctance to disregard the Florida Supreme Court's disclaimer in
Brown. Most significantly, the Ford ruling moves many death row in-
mates closer to execution, since Brown was the final issue being raised
in their appeals.
Origin of the Issue: Brown v. Wainwright
In the fall of 1980, 123 convicted murderers, at that time compris-
ing nearly all of Florida's death row population, petitioned the Florida
Supreme Court for relief from allegedly unconstitutional death
sentences.9 The prisoners' petition alleged that, for a number of years,
a petitioner in Brown, he became the first to satisfy exhaustion requirements and be
eligible to raise the claim in his individual habeas corpus action.
6. Ford v. Strickland, 676 F.2d 434 (11th Cir. 1982).
7. Id. at 444.
8. Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
9. Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1000 (1981). The name of convicted murderer Joseph Brown appeared first on the
petition and, since the Florida Supreme Court declined to acknowledge a class habeas
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 7
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss2/7
1 7:1983 Ford v. Strickland 417
the Florida Supreme Court systematically "'engaged in the continuing
practice of requesting and receiving information concerning capital ap-
pellants which was not presented at trial and not a part of the trial
record or record on appeal.' "10 Documented by transmittal letters to
Starke Prison requesting that confidential reports be sent directly to the
Florida Supreme Court, the suit charged the court with improperly re-
viewing "pre-sentence investigations, psychiatric evaluations or contact
notes made in the corrections system after conviction, and psychologi-
cal screening reports made after conviction by prison personnel."" As-
suming their truth, the allegations in Brown exposed a practice unique
to Florida and questionable from a constitutional perspective. By re-
viewing these reports on an ex parte basis, without allowing defense
counsel an opportunity to examine or challenge their contents, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court may have violated a United States Supreme Court
decision, Gardner v. Florida,1 2 relating to proper standards for sentenc-
ing in capital cases, and denied due process rights of individual
prisoners.
In the Florida Supreme Court's view, the Brown petitioners "con-
tend[ed] that our alleged misconduct requires our invalidation of all
death sentences imposed or approved in Florida, and by necessary im-
plication, that we declare Florida's death penalty statute invalid and
unconstitutional in its operation." 3
A. The Florida Supreme Court's Disclaimer
The acrimonious manner in which the Florida Supreme Court at-
tacked the suit in their ruling demonstrates how deeply rankled the
justices were by the prisoners' accusations. First, even though the peti-
corpus action, it was in his name alone that the ruling was eventually issued.
10. Brown, 392 So. 2d at 1330. The reasons for the justices' behavior have never
been divulged. As one commentator pointed out, their motivations may have been to
seek justifications for reducing sentences, in the face of a growing public demand for
executions. Cramer, supra note 3, at 26. Benign motives, however, could not forestall
cries of "foul!" by prisoners and counsel disturbed by the surreptitious nature of the
court's acts.
11. Brown, 392 So. 2d at 1330.
12. 430 U.S. 349 (1977), cited in Brown, 392 So. 2d at 1330-31.
13. Brown, 392 So. 2d at 1331.
3
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tion was filed with the name of each of the 123 participating inmates
attached, the court refused to allow what it saw as a type of class ac-
tion proceeding. 14 The court pointed out that the petitioners were in
different stages of appeal and noted that allowing a joint petition
"would distort habeas corpus beyond recognition and create a perni-
cious precedent in capital cases."' 5 Vowing to reject any such future
"class actions" summarily, the court nonetheless stated in the next
breath that it would "avoid absurd technicalities" by disposing of the
claims for relief of all the Brown petitioners in its disposition of
Brown's individual petition. 8
While declining to make any factual findings or admit to receipt of
any non-record material in reviewing capital sentences, the court stated
that even if the petitioners' most serious charges were true, the court's
review of the challenged material was totally irrelevant to its appellate
function or to the validity of any individual death sentence.17
Citing Florida's death penalty statute,' the court proceeded to
construe its role in capital cases as qualitatively different from the trial
judge's role of sentence "imposition."'" Appellate "review" consisted of
two very limited functions: first, to determine whether procedural regu-
larities were observed in the sentencing and secondly, to compare the
case under review with all past capital cases to ensure relative propor-
tionality. The statute gives the court no independent fact-finding role.
So long as the trial court properly followed procedures and no dispro-
portionality exists, it must affirm thie sentence. With the court's func-
tion so tightly circumscribed, "it is evident . . . that non-record infor-
mation we may have seen . . . plays no role in capital sentence
'review'. ''20 Finally, the court vigorously disclaimed the possibility that
14. Id. at 1329-30.
15. Id. at 1330.
16. Id. at 1330. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit would use the Ford case to make
a sweeping disposition of this issue.
17. Brown, 392 So. 2d at 1331.
18. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1979).
19. Brown, 392 So. 2d at 1331.
20. Id. at 1332-33. Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (The Supreme
Court's expressed concern, in the first amendment area, that irrelevant information
may be utilized in rendering administrative decisions, with no effective means of judi-
cial review).
4
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it would improperly use any non-record information in fulfilling its
duties.
A remaining question is whether the reading of non-record
documents would so affect members of this Court that they could
not properly perform their assigned appellate functons. Plainly, it
would not. Just as trial judges are aware of matters they do not
consider in sentencing, [citation omitted] so appellate judges are
cognizant of information that they must disregard in performance
of their judicial tasks.21
The effect of this disclaimer, however, is somewhat diluted by a foot-
note comment: "The 'tainted' information we are charged with review-
ing was, as counsel concedes, in every instance obtained to deal with
newly-articulated procedural standards."22 This cryptic statement inti-
mates that the justices did use the psychological profiles in some
manner.
B. Implications of Proffitt v. Florida and Gardner v. Florida
Two leading cases discussed throughout the Florida Supreme
Court's opinion and of paramount importance to the eventual resolution
of the Brown issue were Proffitt v. Florida23 and Gardner v. Florida.24
In Proffitt, decided in 1976, the United States Supreme Court ap-
proved Florida's new death penalty statute, enacted in the wake of
Furman v. Georgia.25 Since judge, jury and appellate courts were ac-
corded distinct roles, with a minimum of discretion at each level, Flor-
ida's scheme did not violate the eighth or fourteenth amendments' pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Proffitt plurality
emphasized the importance of mandatory appellate review in prevent-
ing arbitrary sentencing, noting that "the Florida court has undertaken
responsibily to perform its function of death sentence review with a
maximum of rationality and consistency. '26 Language in the opinion
21. Id. at 1333.
22. Id. at 1333 n.17.23. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
24. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
25. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
26. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258-59.
5
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suggests that appellate review was seen as an arm of the sentencing
process.27 Gardner, a case closely following Proffitt, invalidated a Flor-
ida death sentence in which the trial judge overruled the jury's recom-
mendation for a life sentence, relying in part on a confidential report
that had not been disclosed to the defendant or to his counsel.
Confronted with the Gardner holding in Brown, the Florida Su-
preme Court dismissed it rather breezily, stating:
Gardner stands for the proposition that a sentence of death may
not be imposed (note the word "imposed") to any extent on non-
record, unchallengeable information. Since we do not "impose"
sentences in capital cases, Gardner presents no impediment to the
advertent or inadvertent receipt of some non-record information.28
The justices believed Proffitt provided support for their distinction be-
tween the trial and appellate levels in capital sentencing.
C. Justice Marshall's Dissent
Although the United States Supreme Court declined to grant
Brown's petition for certiorari,29 Justice Marshall wrote a dissent that
portended many concerns echoed by judges passing on the same issue
in Ford. Justice Marshall addressed the questionable nature of the
Florida court's review practice, which seemed to him a violation of due
process. He regarded the practice as inconsistent with his court's past
insistence on strict procedural regularity, especially since the material
seen by the Florida Supreme Court appeared to be unreliable hear-
say.30 Gardner, he proposed, "suggested no relevant distinction between
27. Under Florida's capital-sentencing procedures, in sum, trial judges are
given specific and detailed guidance to assist them in deciding whether to
impose a death penalty or life imprisonment. Moreover, their decisions are
reviewed to ensure that they are consistent with other sentences imposed in
similar circumstances. Thus, in Florida, as in Georgia, it is no longer true
that there is 'no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which
[the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.'
Id. at 253 (citations omitted).
28. Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327, 1332 (Fla. 1981) (citations omitted).
29. 454 U.S. 1000 (1981).
30. Id. at 1001 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
6
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the trial court's initial imposition of a sentence and an appellate court's
discharge of its mandatory review function." 1 In Justice Marshall's
opinion, the imposition/review distinction drawn by the Florida court
was irreconcilable with Proffitt. If ex parte reports were actually re-
ceived, the Proffitt court's premise that the Florida court would under-
take rational and consistent review was, in his view, clearly invalid. If
sentences had been upheld or vacated based on non-record grounds,
there would be no way for the Florida court to conduct a review for
proportionality. Finally, Justice Marshall articulated the bottom-line
question which resounds throughout the Brown and Ford cases, "If the
court does not use the disputed non-record information in performing
its appellate function, why has it systematically sought the
information? 3 2
Ford v. Strickland P3
A. The Facts of Ford3 4
The second name listed on the unsuccessful Brown petition was
that of Alvin Bernard Ford, a death row inmate convicted of murdering
a Fort Lauderdale policeman. On the morning of July 2, 1974, Ford
and three accomplices, having decided to commit a robbery, went with
weapons to a Fort Lauderdale restaurant. During the robbery, several
employees escaped from the restaurant. Realizing the police would soon
arrive, Ford's accomplices fled while Ford unknowingly remained be-
hind, completing a theft of approximately $7,000 from the restaurant's
vault. As Ford was leaving the building, he was confronted by Officer
Dimitri Walter Ilyankoff. Ford fired at the officer, shooting him twice
in the abdomen without warning. While Ilyankoff was lying outside the
back door of the restaurant, Ford discovered his accomplices had aban-
doned him. There were no keys in the police cruiser, so Ford returned
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1002.
33. Because of the procedural posture of the Ford case, where the Eleventh Cir-
cuit issued two separate decisions, its earlier ruling will be referred to as "Ford I."
Ford v. Strickland, 676 F.2d 434 (1982).
34. Ford v. State, 374 So. 2d 496, 497 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, Ford v. Florida,
445 U.S. 972 (1980). See also Ford v. Strickland, No. 81-6663, slip. op. at 1-2 (S.D.
Fla. Dec. 10, 1981).
7
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to the officer who had, in the meantime, radioed for assistance and was
struggling to get up. Ford demanded the keys; Ilyankoff tried to coop-
erate. Ford then shot the officer in the head at close range, took the
keys, and escaped in the police cruiser at high speed. He soon aban-
doned the cruiser and stole a Volkswagen, which he was driving when
arrested for the murder.
Evidence at the trial included the testimony of an employee who
saw and heard the shots as she cowered in a utility room at the back of
the restaurant, testimony from a nearby resident who also witnessed
the incident, the tape of Ilyankoff's call for help, and Ford's finger-
prints which were found in the abandoned police cruiser. The jury
found Ford guilty of first degree murder and recommended the death
penalty. Entering a judgment on the verdict, the trial judge sentenced
Ford to death. On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed
both the judgment and sentence,35 and the United States Supreme
Court denied Ford's petition for certiorari.3 6 He then joined in the un-
successful Brown petition. Governor Bob Graham signed a death war-
rant for Ford on November 4, 1981, requiring his execution on Decem-
ber 8, 1981. Represented by a law professor and a staff attorney for the
Southern Prisoners Defense Committee, Ford responded with a flurry
of legal maneuvers. His post-warrant state appeals were concluded on
December 4, when the Florida Supreme Court refused to grant a
stay.37 Ford's recourse was to federal district court in Fort Lauderdale,
where his hastily-filed petition for a writ of habeas corpus was enter-
tained. The district judge refused to issue an immediate stay, instead
conducting a two-day evidentiary hearing on the merits of the Brown
issue and several other claims made by Ford. Finally, on December 7,
1981, the district court ruled against Ford on all points, denying habeas
corpus relief or a stay of execution.3 8 Prior to this, however, the Elev-
enth Circuit entered a stay in order to preserve Ford's right to appeal
the adverse ruling. 9 With his stay being issued only hours before the
35. Ford v. State, 374 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1979).
36. Ford v. Florida, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
37. Ford v. State, 407 So. 2d 907 (1981).
38. Ford v. Strickland, No. 81-6663 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 1981).
39. This was an unusual procedure, as courts confronted with a petition for a
stay of execution prefer to avoid ruling as long as there is any chance of the stay being
granted by a lower court.
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 7
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss2/7
1 7:1983 Ford v. Strickland 423 1
scheduled execution, Ford had come closer to the electric chair than
any other Florida inmate since John Spenkelink. His habeas appeal to
the Eleventh Circuit was the first to present that court with the Brown
issue. Sensing the need for a rapid, definitive resolution of this recur-
ring claim, the court of appeals made a rare grant of a motion by the
State to expedite the appeal.
B. Ford's Legal Argument
In his brief to the Eleventh Circuit, Ford alleged that the Florida
Supreme Court's practice infringed numerous constitutional guaran-
tees: the right to due process of law, to the effective assistance of coun-
sel, to confrontation, to be free from cruel and unusual punishment,
and to be protected against self-incrimination.4 0 Referring to the ex
parte nature of the communications in question and the surreptitious
manner in which they were received, Ford argued that the Florida Su-
preme Court's practice posed a greater risk of prejudice and misplaced
reliance than the trial court's behavior in Gardner.41 If it is constitu-
tionally impermissible for trial judges to entertain extra-record mate-
rial in affirming jury recommendations, should not the logic behind this
guarantee extend to the appellate phase? Ford attacked the Brown
court's description of its role in capital appeals as myopic, 42 marking a
complete departure from its earlier self-characterization as part of a
trifurcated sentencing process.4 3 The Florida Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of itself as a body sharing equally in responsibility for imposing
death sentences had been a major factor in the Proffitt court's approval
of Florida's death penalty scheme. The court's covert practice, Ford
40. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant supra note 3, at 61.
41. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 3, at 63-64 (citing Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1979)).
42. Id. at 66.
43. See, e.g., Dobbert v. State, 375 So. 2d 1069, 1071 (Fla. 1979); Tedder v.
State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). The three components are the jury, which
renders an advisory opinion; the trial court judge, who imposes sentence based on cer-
tain enumerated aggravating and/or mitigating factors, and the Florida Supreme
Court, which conducts a direct mandatory review of all death sentences. Whether the
Florida Supreme Court's role was purely one of review or, as Ford argued, was to
equally share in the responsibility of imposing a death sentence, represented a crucial
distinction for purposes of applying Gardner.
9
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argued, violated his right to reliable, 44 rational4 5 sentencing.
Ford further contended that the secret receipt of non-record infor-
mation "disrupts the court's role as the guardian of proportionality in
capital sentencing."" Disproportionate infliction of the death penalty
could be anticipated, since the formal record will be incomplete, por-
tions invisible to appellants and other courts, which may really have
shaped the outcome.47 Ford refused to credit the Florida court's dis-
claimed statement as providing an acceptable explanation for its
conduct.
Even though Ford's legal arguments were persuasive, his petition
suffered from the lack of documentation supporting the allegation that
he had been a target of solicitation. This deficiency forced Ford to
charge the Florida Supreme Court with the general claim that it had
reviewed extra-record reports on a regular basis, and later purged them
from its files. The purge, according to Ford, made factual substantia-
tion of an individual's claim very difficult. Ford claimed he was entitled
to an opportunity to prove his allegations, possibly gaining relief from
his death sentence. He proposed remanding the case to the district
court so that discovery proceedings could be undertaken which, al-
though unstated, seemed almost certain to be directed against the Flor-
ida Supreme Court justices. 48 This inability to specifically tie any in-
jury to himself may have been a "fatal-flaw" in Ford's petition due to
the nature of habeas corpus relief.49
44. As required by Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). "[T]his qualita-
tive difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability
when the death sentence is imposed."
45. As guaranteed by Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). "It is of
vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose
the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or
emotion."
46. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 3, at 72.
47. Id.
48. The possible course such proceedings might have taken is discussed at note
90, infra.
49. The gravamen of habeas corpus relief is that direct harm has occurred to the
prisoner as a result of the alleged violation. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). In rejecting
Ford's petition, the federal district judge declared it to be wholly speculative as to him,
and labelled Ford's expressed need for discovery a "fishing expedition." Ford v. Strick-
land, No. 81-6663, slip. op. at 8 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 1981).
10
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C. The State's Response
The State's brief emphasized the fact that Ford's claims were, as
to him, totally unsubstantiated.50 Moreover, the Brown issue involved
an interpretation of Florida's death penalty scheme. As a matter of
state law, the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation should be inviola-
ble. The State defended the Florida court's distinction between the im-
position and review phases of capital sentencing. Since Ford's constitu-
tional rights were observed at trial, and the sentencer did not use any
undisclosed information, his asserted due process violation was un-
founded. The State pointed out that when the Florida Supreme Court
acts to change a capital sentence, it can only do so in one way - to
reduce a sentence from death to life imprisonment. The court has no
authority to review a sentence where life imprisonment was imposed
and increase it to death. Even if non-record materials were viewed by
the Florida Supreme Court during their review, what harm could be
done? 51
Ford's proportionality argument is countered with the retort:
If the unstated premise in the Appellant's argument is that the
state appellate court routinely decides cases on bases other than
and unrelated to the reasoning stated in the Court's decision, it
must fall for the Appellant's bare and unsupported allegations fail
to overcome the presumption that judges duly and regularly per-
form their judicial acts and duties.52
Whether the allegations against the Florida Supreme Court were suffi-
cient to overcome this presumption was to become a pivotal issue in the
Eleventh Circuit's analysis. As its final point, the State noted that Ford
produced no cases where the sentence of a similarly charged and sen-
tenced defendant was reduced. The State cited numerous cases where
capital sentences were affirmed in circumstances similar to Ford's.53
50. Answer Brief of Resondents-Appellees at 51-52, Ford v. Strickland, 676 F.2d
434 (11th Cir. 1982).
51. Id. at 56.
52. Id. at 58.
53. Id. at 60. See, e.g., Tafero v. State, 403 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1981); Raulerson v.
State, 358 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1978); Cooper v. State, 336 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 1976);
Holmes v. State, 374 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1977).
11
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D. Ford v. Strickland I: The Panel Opinion
Following briefs and oral arguments, Ford's case was submitted to
a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Febru-
ary, 1982. Any doubt that the Eleventh Circuit intended to use Ford to
make a blanket ruling on the' Brown issue was dispelled by the strong
language and directives in a stay of execution granted another Florida
inmate while Ford was under advisement.5 In that order, Chief Judge
Godbold characterized the Brown issue as "a serious and difficult one"
and declared that the district judge erred in not entering a stay while
the specially expedited Ford case was pending.55
On April 15, 1981, the panel rendered a two to one decision af-
firming the district court's denial of relief on all grounds, including the
Brown claim. 6 In an opinion authored by Judge Roney and joined by
Judge Virgil Pittman,5 7 the panel ruled that the Florida Supreme
Court's disclaimer in Brown would be accepted as vindicating them of
any wrong. Starting at the outset that they rejected the Brown conten-
tion "both generally and specifically as made for Ford," the panel
found the Florida Supreme Court's description of its function to be cor-
rect and aptly stated.58 The Florida court engaged only in sentence re-
view, not imposition, so their distinction of the Gardner case was valid.
Ford's alleged due process violations were found to be without merit.
Moreover, the majority ruled that "there is not an iota of evidence to
indicate the Florida Supreme Court viewed any extra-record materials
in affirming petitioner's conviction and sentence," 59 nor that, had it
done so, such review would have been harmful. Labelling Ford's claims
bare and unsupported, 0 they approved the district court's refusal to
permit discovery. The majority stressed that principles of comity and
federalism demand deference to the Florida court's interpretation of its
54. Goode v. Wainwright, 670 F.2d 941 (11th Cir. 1982).
55. Id. at 942.
56. Ford v. Strickland, 676 F.2d 434 (11th Cir. 1982).
57. Significantly, a visiting judge from the Southern District of Alabama, sitting
by designation.
58. Ford, 676 F.2d at 444.
59. Id.
60. Id.
12
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procedural role'1 and its statement that its members properly perform
their functions.
In a biting dissent, Judge Kravitch criticized what she saw as the
majority's wholesale adoption of the Florida Supreme Court's reason-
ing.62 She inferred that the Eleventh Circuit was more interested in
expediting its docket than ensuring that federal standards are applied
to capital sentencing cases. Describing herself as disturbed and unper-
suaded by the majority's discussion, Judge Kravitch declared that am-
biguities in Brown left the question of the Florida court's conduct un-
resolved.6" If "tainted" information were used by the court, it would
undercut the defendant's right to a rational, reliable review as guaran-
teed by the United States Supreme Court in Proffitt. Any attempt to
confine the implications of Gardner to the trial level is based on an
illusory distinction. An appellate court's use of erroneous or misinter-
preted material may lead to arbitrary imposition of the death sentence
as easily as use by a trial judge." Judge Kravitch skirted the comity
issue, but proposed that Ford be given an opportunity to develop a fac-
tual record through discovery or an evidentiary proceeding in the dis-
trict court.
Thirteen days after this divisive opinion was issued, the court of
appeals sua sponte ordered that Ford be reheard en banc.65 Although
no reasons were given for this uncommon procedure, perhaps the nar-
row wording in parts of Ford, which did not foreclose the Brown claim
to petitioners with direct evidence, displeased those members of the
court hoping for a more broad-brush ruling. Without a complete dispo-
sition, the Brown issue would resurface in various forms for years to
61. "As the highest court in the state, the Florida Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of its procedural role is the law of the state and we do not question it." Id.
62. Id. at 451.
63. Id.
64. [T]he risk that an appellate court's reliance on nonrecord information,
without providing notice to the defendant of the substance of that informa-
tion or an opportunity to contest its accuracy, will result in the affirmance
of a sentence on the basis of erroneous or misinterpreted information
presents as great a threat of the arbitrary imposition of death condemned
in Furman as the risk involved when such a procedure is engaged in by the
initial sentencer.
Id. at 454.
65. Id. at 456.
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come, and the questions involved required a unified, dispositive treat-
ment. The fact that the panel's ruling turned on the vote of a visiting
judge,6 with the two permanent court members splitting, might have
provided an impetus for rehearing. In any event, the number of counsel
for both sides multiplied, supplemental briefs were filed, and extended
oral arguments were scheduled for June, 1982.7
Arguments made in Ford's supplemental brief remained substan-
tially the same. Buoyed by Judge Kravitch's dissent, the defense brief
emphasized the ambiguities in Brown and hammered away on the pos-
sibility of a Gardner violation if the court had actually used non-record
material."8 The fact that the judges systematically solicited the mate-
rial rather than passively received it belied the suggestion that it was
not used, and rebutted the presumption of proper conduct regarded as
dispositive by the panel majority.6 9
The State took on a more aggressive tone, relying on a recent
United States Supreme Court ruling70 which pointedly reminded fed-
eral courts not to make unwarranted assumptions about the conduct of
state judges. As the Court had said, a federal court may not require a
state court to explain the reasons for its actions unless it first deter-
66. See supra note 57.
67. A distinguished former federal court judge, Marvin E. Frankel, who had ar-
gued Brown to the Florida Supreme Court, was recalled by the NAACP to assist on
the brief and deliver Ford's oral argument. Obviously the defense hoped Frankel would
be better received by the federal court than in state court, where his demeanor had
been described as patronizing, imperious, and arrogant. Cramer, supra note 3, at 24.
68. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner-Appellant on Rehearing En Banc at 14-16,
Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804 (11th Cir. 1983).
69. The Ford majority determined that the Florida Supreme Court was entitled
to the presumption of correctness accorded state court's findings on factual issues under
the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976); cf. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S.
539 (1981). But can the Brown ruling, in which the court's analysis proceeds from a
hypothetical ("Even if petitioners' most serious charges were accepted as true .
392 So. 2d at 1331) really be regarded as a proper subject of the presumption?
70. Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339 (1981), in which a trial judge conducting a
bench trial rendered what appeared to be inconsistent verdicts. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals accepted the defendant's argument that the judge must have consid-
ered inadmissible evidence in arriving at his decision, and ordered that relief be granted
unless the judge issued an explanation for his actions. The United States Supreme
Court reversed this ruling, holding that a federal court may not require a state court to
explain itself unless its actions are first determined to be unconstitutional.
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mines that those actions violated the Constitution. The Florida court's
act of soliciting and receiving non-record information would not violate
the Constitution since it cannot be presumed that the reports were con-
sidered in passing on the cases. In fact, the court is entitled to the
opposite presumption. Judge Kravitch's dissent, raising the possibility
of misuse as a rationale for granting relief, showed just the kind of
speculation that was disapproved in Harris. The only issue presented
was not why the Florida justices acted as they did, but whether they
improperly used any non-record information in arriving at decisions.
Not only had the Florida Supreme Court disclaimed any consideration
of nonrecord material in Brown, but its opinions in capital cases thor-
oughly discuss the facts and law pertinent to its decision. Speculative
assumptions cannot overcome the presumption that the Florida justices
acted properly, or justify requiring them to testify to their thought
processes in federal court.7 '
Ford v. Strickland II: The En Banc Ruling
After lengthy and impassioned arguments, the Eleventh Circuit
took Ford under advisement in June, 1982. The number of complex
issues as well as the divergent attitudes towards their resolution possi-
bly explains why no opinion was issued until January, 1983. In the in-
terim, more stays of execution had been granted based on the pendency
of Ford.2 When finally issued, with a blaze of publicity, the six to five
division of the judges and the sheer size of the opinion showed how
protracted and diligent the judges' labors were. Their per curiam opin-
ion, which serves as a preface to the five separate opinions, makes ref-
erence to the full briefing, extended oral arguments, and months of de-
liberation which comprised the court's efforts.7 3
71. Supplemental Brief of Respondents-Appellees on Rehearing En Banc at 12-
13, Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804 (11th Cir. 1983).
72. See, e.g., Christopher v. Florida, 541 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Palmes
v. Wainwright, No. 583 (M.D. Fla. June 11, 1982); Straight v. Wainwright, No. 82-
607 (M.D. Fla. June 15, 1982); Johnson v. Wainwright, No. 82-875 (M. D. Fla. May
14, 1982).
73. In a bizarre note, the per curiam opinion reveals that, several months into
their deliberations, the judges received a communication from Ford purporting to be a
request that all appellate proceedings cease and his sentence be carried out. After nine
15
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A. The Eleventh Circuit's Analysis
The author of the panel's opinion, Judge Roney, on rehearing was
joined by four others in his opinion affirming the district court's denial
of relief to Ford. Judge Tjoflat, through a separate opinion, became the
final member of the plurality to reject the Brown issue on its merits.
Judge Roney summarized the issues raised by Ford's Brown claim
in the following three questions.7 If just one were answered affirma-
tively, the court of appeals would be faced with a possible constitu-
tional violation.7 5 The first question, "Does Florida state law permit the
use of such non-record material in the review of Ford's sentence, or any
other capital sentence?" was answered in the negative, based on the
Brown court's statement that factors outside the record were irrelevant
and played no part in their sentence review role. Regarding their sec-
ond question, "Was the material used in contravention of state law?"
the plurality replied that they "must be content" to answer no. The
highest court of a state must be presumed to follow its own law and
procedures. Since Ford was a class petitioner in Brown, he is subject to
the court's statement that non-record materials were not used in re-
viewing the petitioners' sentences. Ford did not specifically allege that
he had been treated differently from all others. Referring to "current
notions of comity and federalism," the court recoiled from the prospect
of requiring a state's appellate judges to respond to questions in federal
court concerning what was or was not considered by them in review of
years of appeals, it certainly seems incredible that Ford's attitude would so change
almost on the eve of a full review of his claims. The court refused to be dissuaded from
ruling, however, dismissing his request as "untimely."
Another interesting preface to the court's treatment of the Brown issue is the pres-
ence on the court of Judge Hatchett, a former Florida Supreme Court justice who had
affirmed Ford's conviction on direct appeal shortly before his appointment to the fed-
eral bench. Of course, he recused himself from any part of the Ford case. Considering
that, at its most fundamental level, the Brown issue as raised by Ford really does seek
to explore the mental processes of judges, it is interesting to contemplate that the
judges had in their midst a man, possessed of candid, firsthand knowledge of the Flor-
ida court's actual use of non-record material, who was relegated to the role of mute
spectator to the proceedings. Had the relief Ford requested been granted, one of the
Eleventh Circuit's own brethren would have been subject to whatever discovery proce-
dures the district court authorized.
74. Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 810 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
75. Id.
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a state case.
Finally, in response to its third question, "Would reading the non-
record material so affect the Florida judges that the federal court
should, for constitutional review purposes, treat the case as if the infor-
mation had been used by them?" the court ruled that the Florida Su-
preme Court's holding in Brown supplied a negative answer, thus con-
cluding the matter for purposes of review. Despite his commitment to
principles of comity, Judge Roney's uneasiness with the Florida court's
ambiguous language and "veiled suggestion(s)" in Brown is expressed
in his final comments. He wishes the Florida court had given a candid
answer to the perplexing question first raised by Justice Marshall in his
dissent to the denial of certiorari in Brown, i.e., if the court did not use
the disputed information, then why had it sought it?"6
In his separate concurring opinion, Judge Tjoflat agrees that
Brown effectively disposed of the issue but adds that a crucial distinc-
tion has not been adequately made by the majority. Neither Gardner
nor any other authority, he maintains, forbids an appellate court from
merely reading non-record material, so long as it does not rely on it.
Maybe the Florida court's statement did not deny reading non-record
material about the petitioners, but it clearly denied relying on any ex-
tra-record factors in reviewing their sentences. Since Ford's case was
effectively embraced in the Brown holding, his claim is especially lack-
ing in merit. Judge Tjoflat rejects Ford's contention that an exception
be made to the premise that judges disregard what they must simply
because the Florida court solicited rather than passively received the
reports.77 If such a capability exists, he responds, it does not logically
depend on how the information is obtained. Even if such a distinction
were conceptually valid, it would be unworkable as a practical matter.
Considering how frequently judges see non-record information, count-
less claims would be made charging that a judge saw information he
could not disregard. If such claims turned on the factual issue of
whether the judge requested the information or passively received it,
the burden on the justice system would be staggering.
In conclusion, Judge Tjoflat remarks that the premise of proper
judicial conduct falls when a judge's behavior appears so improper that
76. Id. at 811.
77. Id. at 833.
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it is detrimental to society at large. In such a case, appearance rather
than a judge's actual capabilities is at issue. Judge Tjoflat suggests
that, had Ford's claim proceeded on this basis, his "swing vote" might
have gone the other way."
A troublesome aspect of the case is the majority's failure to meet
Ford's argument that use of non-record material undercuts the man-
dated "proportionality" review. If extra-record material does influence
Florida Supreme Court reviews, the real reasons for upholding or com-
muting a death sentence will be obscured. Thus, the ability of later
appellants to receive a meaningful comparative review will be impaired.
Given the tenor of the majority's decision, however, further arguments
on this issue are unwelcome.
B. The Dissenting Opinions
The three separate dissenting opinions share a number of common
themes.7 9 Each expresses dissatisfaction with the Florida Supreme
Court's language in Brown, and an unwillingness to accept it as disposi-
tive. According to Judge Kravitch, the court neither denied that it sys-
tematically requested and received such information, nor acknowledged
that the practice is legally objectionable. Moreover, it did not specifi-
cally disclaim having used the non-record information it admittedly ob-
tained; it said only that such information is "irrelevant." She maintains
the court conceded such use by its footnote statement that "[tihe
'tainted' information we are charged with reviewing was . . . in every
instance obtained to deal with newly-articulated procedural stan-
dards." 80 Likewise, Judge Godbold states that he "cannot find in the
Florida Supreme Court's opinion what the majority describes as 'the
statement that it [extrinsic material] was not used,' and that the dispa-
rate views of the judges on this point further demonstrates the opinion's
78. Id.
79. Of the five dissenters, three wrote separate opinions. Judge Kravitch wrote a
lengthy opinion incorporating many of her earlier criticisms. Chief Judge Godbold is-
sued an opinion joined by Judge Clark. Judge Johnson wrote an independent dissenting
opinion and, finally, Judge Anderson, with no separate opinion, joined those of Judges
Godbold, Kravitch and Johnson with respect to the Brown issue.
80. Ford, 696 F.2d at 851-52.
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'intractable ambiguity.' "81 In his opinion, Judge Johnson reads Brown
to say that the court actually did consider nonrecord material. 2
Given this difference of opinion as to the extent of the disclaimer,
the dissenters maintain that the majority erred in accepting it without
a more thorough analysis. In a strident tone, Judge Kravitch character-
izes the majority's analysis as an "attempt to evade the difficult ques-
tions presented,"8 and Judge Johnson states that "the majority simply
cannot avoid the direct implication of Gardner."" The gravamen of the
dissents is that Gardner does apply to appellate as well as trial courts.
Death sentence cases, under Gardner, "require a greater degree of reli-
ability than others" and the Florida Supreme Court's solicitation of ex-
tra-record materials, in Judge Johnson's opinion, has jeopardized the
degree of reliability and rationality required in the administration of'
the death penalty.8 5 A violation of due process and other constitutional
protections is thus present. Judge Kravitch confronts the comity issue
by stating that where a state court has ruled that its own procedure is
legally sound, independent federal constitutional issues are raised mak-
ing review by a federal court proper.88
While the dissenters agree as to the nature of the constitutional
problem, each proposes a different remedy. Judge Godbold maintains
that a direct, unequivocal statement by the Florida Supreme Court
would satisfy him.87 A conditional grant of Ford's petition by the dis-
trict court is proposed by Judge Johnson, who also seeks a more definite
statement from the Florida court: He would have the writ become final
"in the event that the Florida Supreme Court does not grant petitioner
a new direct review of his conviction and sentence."88 Such a review, to
satisfy Judge Johnson, would have to be undertaken without the benefit
of non-record material or, if such material were used, with prior notice
to Ford and his counsel. Under Judge Kravitch's analysis, the ambigu-
ous statements by the court overcome the presumption of regularity.
81. Id. at 821.
82. Id. at 874.
83. Id. at 850.
84. Id. at 872.
85. Id. at 872-73.
86. Id. at 852.
87. Id. at 821.
88. Id. at 874.
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Accordingly, she would place the burden on the State to affirmatively
demonstrate that non-record information was not requested, received,
or used by the Florida Supreme Court in connection with Ford's case.
She would deny relief to Ford only if the State met this burden. If not,
she would grant Ford a new appellate review of his sentence89 with the
conditions proposed by Judge Johnson.
Interestingly, none of the judges, either in the majority or the dis-
sent, confronted directly the issue of the impact that granting relief to
Ford would have had on the Florida justice system. Ford asked for re-
mand to the district court so that he could undertake full discovery.
While his counsel at oral argument refused to commit himself as to
what the scope of such discovery might encompass, the claims made by
Ford, if given cognizance, would seem to require nothing less than an
exploration of the justices' motivations and actual mental processes. 0
89. Id. at 853. It is noteworthy that this remedy differs from that proposed in her
dissent to the April panel opinion, where she argued in favor of a remand for eviden-
tiary procedures. Ford v. Strickland, 676 F.2d 434, 455 (1 1th Cir. 1982). While earlier
in her second opinion, Judge Kravitch argues that discovery would not result in embar-
rassment to the Florida Supreme Court, she is unconvincing and clearly uncomfortable
with the sensitive issues a remand would raise.
90. In the words of the opinion:
[I]t is obnoxious both to the traditional role and procedures of the appel-
late process and to current notions of comity and federalism to suggest
that a state appellate judge should be required to respond in a federal
court to questions concerning what was or was not considered by him in
the review of a state case. Petitioner virtually admits his argument would
eventually carry that far if all else failed in obtaining the proof of what he
asserts. Any principle that supports the start of that journey would support
a conclusion which is not now a part of American law.
Ford, 696 F.2d at 811. (Roney, J., plurality opinion).
While it is speculative to envision what might have followed in the event of a
remand, discovery would probably, as a courtesy, have taken the form of depositions or
interrogatories rather than examination in open court. The question then posed is
whether it would be sufficient to undertake discovery only in Ford's case. Perhaps the
procedures would have to be repeated 123 times to vindicate the claims of all similarly
situated inmates.
If, instead, the relief granted were a right to a fresh, direct review, how could the
court of appeals overcome the argument that the Florida justices were already tainted?
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, made this point in a recent dissent to a
denial of certiorari in another Florida case. A trial judge found to have previously
considered inadmissible material re-imposed a death on remand. The justices objected
1 434 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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Had Ford prevailed, the stage would have been set for vacating
the death sentences of nearly two-thirds of Florida's death row inmates.
The upheaval such an outcome would have caused can easily be
imagined.91 Quite possibly, the Brown issue provided a greater threat to
Florida's statutory death penalty scheme and its judiciary than any
claim raised by death row inmates since Furman v. Georgia.92
Conclusion
Unlike the more narrowly-worded panel opinion, the en banc rul-
ing on Ford clearly intended to sweep within its scope the similar
claims of all Florida inmates, regardless of their ability to document
their allegations. As a blanket ruling, it effectively disposes of the
Brown issue unless certiorari is granted by the Supreme court. In a
press interview given January 10, 1983, 93 Florida Attorney General
Jim Smith stated that, for many death row inmates, the decision ended
their avenues of appeal, and predicted that executions would resume in
four to six months. Pending disposition of his petition for certiorari,
however, the stay of Ford's execution remains in effect.
Whether the Supreme Court will agree to hear Ford on certiorari
is debatable. It refused to hear Brown less than two years ago, and
declined to grant a stay of execution in the Spenkelink case. 94 The
Ford case only affects Florida and thus may not be seen of sufficient
national importance to justify the court's review. Sentiment on the cur-
rent court to stretch comity notions and leave unchallenged the highest
to the same judge reviewing his previously imposed sentence. Harvard v. Florida, No.
82-5444, 51 U.S.L.W. 3505 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983). Fairness standards articulated in
Gardner require that resentencing be entrusted to a different judge, to avoid the possi-
bility that the judge previously imposing a death sentence may do so again based on a
"natural human tendency to rationalize it and suppress doubts." Id. at 3507. It is thus
likely that if granted, a viable review of Ford's case would have required appointment
of special associate justices.
91. As a most dire speculation, the public outcry that would surely accompany a
ruling that the Florida justices had caused their death penalty statute to be invalidated,
by virtue of their own furtive behavior, might have shamed the responsible members of
the court into resigning.
92. 408 U.S. 238 (1971).
93. Fort Lauderdale News, Jan. 11, 1983, at 6A, col. 1.
94. Spenkelink v. Wainwright, 442 U.S. 1301 (1979).
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state court's interpretations of state law may prevail over the dissent-
ers' suggestion that the Florida Supreme Court's disclaimer should be
discounted. Moreover, both sides to the debate realize that the Brown
issue has been reviewed fully and conscientiously. The fact that the
Eleventh Circuit twice entertained the case and twice ruled in favor of
the State may discourage the Supreme Court from feeling that it would
elicit any new perspective.
As a countervailing consideration, Florida's death row population
stands at 201. 95 Although only one state would be affected by a Su-
preme Court decision in Ford, the number of inmates whose lives are
at stake is the nation's largest. Finally, because the Ford opinion was
so closely divided, the Court may see the lack of consensus as signaling
a need for its consideration. Unless certiorari is granted, however, the
mystery and unanswered questions which surrounded the Florida Su-
preme Court's practice seem destined to remain so.
Valerie Shea
95. Miami Herald, Mar. 5, 1983, at 1 A, col. 1.
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